Clients are typically asked to assess to what extent the perceived symptoms affects their day-to-day life, any changes, etc., in addition to conferring with friends/family for their point of view on this. These are considered in addition to an absolute deviance from the "average spectrum" and diagnostic criteria.
I don't really think the pathologization of homosexuality is comparable to modern issues, as the reasons for this were very much informed by its historical context (its history as an immoral concept in christian/western culture, the state of psychology and psychiatry as fields at the time vs. now, etc.) in a way modern diagnoses aren't.
Also, according to Wikipedia [0], APA members were critical to homosexuality as a disorder at least from its inclusion in the first DSM.
What's your source for your claims? In the US, a lot of mental illnesses are medicated by general practitioners, and mental health insurance coverage is notoriously poor. That sounds like a great way to work, but it's not how I see the system actually working.
That you don't think pathologization of homosexuality is comparable is, I suppose, fine for you. I obviously do or I wouldn't have made the comparison. It's not like we don't have a historical context now as well; it's just a different context. In particular, the US has some very deeply culturally embedded notions about work ethic and willpower that are relevant to ADD and addiction treatment. That we corrected one mistake does not mean we corrected the general pattern of mistake.
Regarding the last bit, glad to know Wikipedia is now a reliable source when you're citing it in your favor.
There are sources abound [0-3]. The four Ds of abnormality [0] might be of particular interest.
The point may be better explained (as I'll get back to) by textbooks and lecture notes, also available via Google.
That's the case in much of the world, which is indeed considered a problem, and may explain why medication may be overutilized.
But the fact that the system's current practice is unfavorable, does not really say anything about the models used to understand mental illness.
ADD comes with certain dysfunction [0] (and perhaps distress) that homosexuality just doesn't, which is one of the reasons for my objection.
While the field of psychopathology is certainly influenced by culture (as is readily acknowledged) I have yet to see any reasonable argument that addiction and ADD are pathologized on the sole basis of falling outside of "normal" experience.
Additionally, the notions of work ethic and willpower that you mention might just as well be used to explain stigma towards the mentally ill – that they should just apply discipline and willpower.
Apropos of sources, I should very much like to see some that claim that ADD as diagnosis is inherently problematic, as opposed to it being abused as a consequence of certain cultures.
My gripe with your previous use of Wikipedia was not about Wikipedia itself, but the way it was used.
By this I mean that while Wikipedia articles might contain misinformation, it is known to be surprisingly good, for the most part (though certainly no credible academic source).
The problem, though, is that it will in quite a few cases not provide readers with minute details, standard practice or underlying assumptions – Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, not a practitioner's handbook.
You seem to be arguing from the theory of mental health; I am talking about what people do in practice, and the cultural norms and views that shape the application of theory.
As to, "I have yet to see any reasonable argument" bit, I can certainly believe it. But I think that's mainly because you haven't looked. Plenty of people have talked about rampant overdiagnosis of ADHD in the US because putting everybody on stimulants makes classrooms easier to control. Overdiagnosis here means taking healthy but inconvenient behavior and pathologizing it. If people only have "dysfunction" in particular classroom environments with particular teachers, I think it's reasonable to suggest that what's dysfunctional is the environment and the expectation of universal conformity, not the people who are different.
It seems like we are mainly talking in circles here, and given that this is a topic on which I have paid attention to for a couple of decades and also have direct experience, your arguments from Wikipedia theory links aren't going to do much for me. Maybe we should stop now?
The problem is that you talk about what you perceive as flaws in the disease model (theory) in your original post, and unsubstantiatedly claim that 'It posits one notion of normal and then divides everything into "normal therefore fine" or "different, therefore broken".', which is incorrect (as pointed out by DanBC).
If someone applies the model incorrectly, that doesn't undermine the model.
I have looked, and I have heard the arguments you are talking about, some of which I agree with (as you can see from earlier posts), but a common sentiment amongst some of these seem to be the almost conspiratorial belief that it is all based upon suppressing anything other than normal behavior.
I think it is more reasonable to suggest that the bar might be set too low when it comes to this diagnosis in the U.S., than it is to discredit the illness entirely because of what amounts to misdiagnosis. The subject is fraught with nuance.
As for the use of sources, there is clearly a discrepancy between our posts, though mine are admittedly often from Wikipedia.
If a lot of people use a model incorrectly, I think it's worth asking whether it's a bad model. E.g., "Good vs evil" is a popular model, but it leads to enough stupidity I don't think it unreasonable to say that is often applied without nuance.
If you would like a better source, take a look at Hallowell's work. His basic take is that ADHD is not a disease, but a trait:
Of course, he's only a psychiatrist who specializes in ADHD and has written a half-dozen books on the topic, so I'm sure he's just lacking your subtle understanding of the perfection of the disease model. And probably a conspiracy theorist too; there are so many of those on the Harvard Medical School faculty.
And if you'd like more on how the disease model is misused, start with the literature on the medicalization of deviance:
What you're talking about in this thread doesn't translate to applying the model "without nuance", but to wrongly apply the model or to not apply the model at all (since the model is not followed).
That's why I think your first post is wrong; the disease model does not claim that deviancy == illness.
Rather, it claims that the identified problematic behavior is a result of a chemical/biological issue, and doesn't deal with definition of problems at all.
Also worth noting is that the purely biologic view isn't really en vogue any more. AFAIK, the biopsychosocial model is more popular.
In practice, it is valuable to view mental disorders as (i.e. not claim that they are) illnesses, one of the reasons for which you touch upon in your original post.
I have of course heard arguments like Hallowell's before, and I don't think that they're entirely unreasonable, although the gist of them can be applied to psychiatric diagnoses in general, seeing that all symptoms and traits can be said to exist on a scale/spectrum/continuum. Most literature I've seen readily acknowledges this (and notes pitfalls of other kinds, like being somewhat based on social norms). This is the one of the nuances I've previously alluded to.
As I think is quite clear from our exchange, positions like these are not the ones i disagree with, nor the ones I refer to as conspiratorial – that would be those that actually posit conspiratorial "theories", e.g. willful persecution of those outside the "normal" by practitioners, the powers that be, etc.
I'll refrain from commenting on your rude sarcasm and unreasonable assumptions, but know that cherry picking a source and appealing to its authority doesn't make for a convincing (nor logical) argument.
I'm also familiar with medicalization of deviance, though I don't see how this pertains to the disease model, as this kind of social control is possible (and has been performed) via a plethora of means.
P.S. Just came across an editorial [0] that deals with some of this that might be of interest.
I've certainly not intended to come across as rude, only as challenging your assertions. But I guess you'll read into it as you may.
And I certainly don't go attacking straw men before you've even had a chance to answer accusations (as in the rude sarcasm part).
I also note that you have yet to back up your original assertion that the disease model "posits one notion of normal and then divides everything into "normal therefore fine" or "different, therefore broken"', which is hardly surprising, as it doesn't deal with this definition at all.
Clients are typically asked to assess to what extent the perceived symptoms affects their day-to-day life, any changes, etc., in addition to conferring with friends/family for their point of view on this. These are considered in addition to an absolute deviance from the "average spectrum" and diagnostic criteria.
I don't really think the pathologization of homosexuality is comparable to modern issues, as the reasons for this were very much informed by its historical context (its history as an immoral concept in christian/western culture, the state of psychology and psychiatry as fields at the time vs. now, etc.) in a way modern diagnoses aren't.
Also, according to Wikipedia [0], APA members were critical to homosexuality as a disorder at least from its inclusion in the first DSM.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexuality#Psychology