I think Mass Surveillance is a bad idea, extremely high risk and the potential for abuse is high. I also think that it consolidates too much power in one place which is dangerous for the future and the secrecy is a big problem.
That said there is an obvious use for it in helping stop attacks and pretending there isn't is weird to me.
> That line really highlighted the fallacy that "mass surveillance is effective" for me.
Specific evidence of success is likely to be classified. It's possible attacks have been stopped - the classification of information makes it hard to know either way.
Though mass collection can help, if you have intel of suspicious people you could look through the entire history of their communication - see what they've been saying and to whom. When you newly learn that a person is a part of ISIS (for example) you can look through their entire communication stream retroactively. Since the attackers are not always that sophisticated (they used SMS in Paris) you can potentially learn a lot of information by doing this (their network, maybe plans).
They're posting videos of themselves on youtube showing off weapons and locations - I suspect there's a lot of information available in their communication that's useful for stopping attacks. It's a tool you would obviously want if you had to do the job.
That said I think the secrecy is dangerous because it prevents the public from being able to determine what level we'd accept (and legal recourse against abuse). It also is more likely to encourage abuse and since James Clapper lied to congress about it we can't trust the organizations that have tasked themselves to do it.
Thinking long-term, it took a long time to get relatively benign governments - consolidating this much power in one place (especially in secrecy) is something we probably shouldn't do.
> That said there is an obvious use for it in helping stop attacks and pretending there isn't is weird to me.
Where is your evidence for that claim? This article is an example which should be PERFECT to detect. Poitras was under targeted surveillance. And she was still able to communicate with Snowden without detection. The security industrial complex has a terrible track record of success.
there is an obvious use for it in helping stop attacks
It's not that obvious to me. Can you explain why you think this is obvious? Because in order to stop attacks, you need specific, actionable intelligence. Indiscriminate collection of data just muddies the water.
Sure - as mentioned in my previous comment it gives you an entire history of communication to retroactively analyze.
It's not likely to reveal much alone (too much noise - like you suggested), but given a lead from some other means you can use it as a tool to look through the recent communications of that suspect and their close network.
This would be a tool that would be useful to have and since people planning violence are likely communicating about plans - looking at comms could lead to actionable intelligence.
Is this potential intel worth the risk of abuse? I think probably not, but that should probably be decided by the society being surveilled. Either way it definitely should not be done in secret.
I worry that trying to argue surveillance is entirely useless will do more harm overall because to those 'in favor' of surveillance it's a dumb position.
That said there is an obvious use for it in helping stop attacks and pretending there isn't is weird to me.
> That line really highlighted the fallacy that "mass surveillance is effective" for me.
Specific evidence of success is likely to be classified. It's possible attacks have been stopped - the classification of information makes it hard to know either way.
Though mass collection can help, if you have intel of suspicious people you could look through the entire history of their communication - see what they've been saying and to whom. When you newly learn that a person is a part of ISIS (for example) you can look through their entire communication stream retroactively. Since the attackers are not always that sophisticated (they used SMS in Paris) you can potentially learn a lot of information by doing this (their network, maybe plans).
They're posting videos of themselves on youtube showing off weapons and locations - I suspect there's a lot of information available in their communication that's useful for stopping attacks. It's a tool you would obviously want if you had to do the job.
That said I think the secrecy is dangerous because it prevents the public from being able to determine what level we'd accept (and legal recourse against abuse). It also is more likely to encourage abuse and since James Clapper lied to congress about it we can't trust the organizations that have tasked themselves to do it.
Thinking long-term, it took a long time to get relatively benign governments - consolidating this much power in one place (especially in secrecy) is something we probably shouldn't do.