At this point it seems likely that Sedol is actually far outclassed by a superhuman player. The suspicion is that since AlphaGo plays purely for probability of long-term victory rather than playing for points, the fight against Sedol generates boards that can falsely appear to a human to be balanced even as Sedol's probability of victory diminishes. The 8p and 9p pros who analyzed games 1 and 2 and thought the flow of a seemingly Sedol-favoring game 'eventually' shifted to AlphaGo later, may simply have failed to read the board's true state. The reality may be a slow, steady diminishment of Sedol's win probability as the game goes on and Sedol makes subtly imperfect moves that humans think result in even-looking boards...
The case of AlphaGo is a helpful concrete illustration of these concepts [from AI alignment theory]...
Edge instantiation. Extremely optimized strategies often look to us like 'weird' edges of the possibility space, and may throw away what we think of as 'typical' features of a solution. In many different kinds of optimization problem, the maximizing solution will lie at a vertex of the possibility space (a corner, an edge-case). In the case of AlphaGo, an extremely optimized strategy seems to have thrown away the 'typical' production of a visible point lead that characterizes human play...
This is reminding me more and more of the central theme of the book Echopraxia, which was that when dealing with superhuman intelligences, you are by definition not smart enough to even know whether you're winning.
But that is most likely be because of the structure of Chess. The evaluation of single board position is more "linear" and certainly easier than in Go.
If the utility function is about winning, going though easily-evalutable board positions might be the straightforward route.
If the utility function is to win while minimizing your estimate of of you losing, you might see different results.
Plus if you know that you are playing against a stronger opponent, your prior might bias your perception of the board situation.
If that is what is meant then you can't see that you're losing against any player that's any stronger than yourself by definition, because if you could see it earlier you wouldn't have made that move.
As a club level go player (4 kyu AGA) I disagree. When you play against a much stronger human, you very quickly see moves that frustrate your plans, and find yourself struggling to find moves that work.
It's common for the opening to pass by without feeling behind--Go doesn't have set openings to the same extent as chess, but if you play joseki, you might have an opening where the weaker player feels ok. Even that is not guaranteed, but once you start fighting, you will quickly feel the strength difference.
Of course you can play a move that looks good when you play it, but against a much stronger player, it doesn't take long for it to look bad.
Hmm maybe but aren't humans capable of learning too?
One could make the same statement of two humans of different ranks playing each other. In some cases, the more highly ranked player might be the only one who knows who's winning.
This doesn't mean that the lesser ranked player can't improve over time. It just means that at that moment, that player is inexperienced or less skilled, which we already knew.
I'll grant that for this very constrained problem ;-)
I respect your work a lot. I've studied and used ML myself, including gensim, in industry. I've given nowhere near your level of contribution to society / the field. My opinion is true AI is quite a ways off. I haven't read anything from a ML researcher that says it isn't. Perhaps you weren't saying true AI is nearer.
I find it funny that whenever there's a case of computers being able to do something that they couldn't before, whether it's drive or beat humans at Go, the goalpost on what is "true AI" shifts to be something that computers can't do yet.
So let me ask you this. What would you consider to be "true AI"? At what point are you willing to say, "Okay, that's it, computers are just plain smarter than we are?" Because, frankly, it seems to me that that day is getting closer and closer.
Saying that AIs can't be smarter than humans because they don't think and act like humans is like saying that airplanes don't "truly" fly because they don't flap their wings.
He's not saying that AIs can't be smarter than humans. My interpretation is he's implying that AlphaGo does not indicate that much progress towards AGI.
I'd also like to point out that you didn't define "smart" or "intelligent" either. The fact is, it's a very very difficult concept to define.
Reposting this comment from another thread:
The "moving goalposts" argument is one that really needs to die. It's a classic empty statement. Just because other people made <argument> in the past does not mean it's wrong. It proves nothing. People also predicted "true AI" many times over-optimistically; probably just as often as people have moved goalposts.
>> What would you consider to be "true AI"? At what point are you willing to say,
"Okay, that's it, computers are just plain smarter than we are?"
Look, there's no doubt that computers can outperform humans in specific tasks.
There's no doubt that AlphaGo is intelligent when it comes to Go, but on the
other hand it would be completely incapable of tackling a different congitive
task- say, language, or vision, or discriminating between say two species of animal [Edit, since there seems to be confusion on this: you'd need different training data and another training session to perform well at a different task].
That's a limitation of our current systems. They generalise badly, or they don't
model their domain very well. You have to train them again for each different
task that you want them to undertake and their high performance in one task does
not necessarily translate in high performance in another task.
Humans on the other hand are good at generalising, which does seem to be necessary for general intelligence. If we learn to play a board game, we can take the
lessons from it and apply them in, I don't know, business. If we learn maths, we
can then use the knowledge [Edit: of what constitutes a well-formed theory] to tackle physics and chemistry. And so on.
So, let's say that "true AI" is something that can show an ability to generalise
from one domain to another, like humans do, and can be trained in multiple
cognitive tasks at the same time. If we can do that, then computers will already be super-human, because they can already outperform us in terms of speed and precision.
The real question would be is there a goal of the AI. The true superhuman AI, that is problematic, is when AI decides to learn something on its own. And I think that is a long road.
This is simply not true, and there are many tasks the architecture would fail with and the networks presented are architecturally different from the highest performing vision networks like GoogLeNet. The techniques behind AlphaGo have no memory component holding state between moves, such as a hidden state in an RNN. It is completely reactionary.
A simple game that this architecture would fail at is Simon [0], where you are presented a sequence and then are tasked to replay the sequence.
The same statement holds for humans too. I don't think you can teach a person how to play Go and expect him/her to learn anything else than how to play Go.
I'm not talking about learning the rules of the game. You don't need an AI to
model the rules of the game. You need an AI to model the winning strategy.
Winning strategy is what humans generalise to other domains and computers don't.
There's a lot that suggests that humans and
machine learning algorithms learn in very different ways. For instance, by the time a human
can master a game like Go they can also perform image processing, speech
recognition, handwriten digit recognition, word-sense disambiguation and other
similar cognitive tasks. Machine learning algorithms can only do one of those things at
a time. A system trained to do image processing might do it well, but it
won't be able to go from recognising images to recognising the senses of words
in a text without new training, and not without the new training clobbering the
previous training.
To make it perfectly clear: I'm talking about separate instances of possibly the same algorithm, trained
on a different task every time. I'm not saying that CNNs can't do speech recognition because
they're good at image processing. I'm saying that an instance of a CNN that's
learned to tag images must be trained on different data in a different time if
you also want it to do word-sense disambiguation.
And that that is a limitation, that stands in the way of machine learning
algorithms achieving general intelligence.
A human brain (or any other animal brain for that matter) is almost infinitely more advanced and computationally efficient than state of the art machine intelligence, even without taking things like thoughts, emotions and dreams - which we currently do not understand at all - into account.
It's a huge accomplishment for machines to be able to win over humans in games like chess and go and <insert game here>, but these are games originally designed for humans - by humans - to be played recreationally and I think we shouldn't read too much into it.
Didn't you see KarateKid: wax on, wax off. Jokes aside, as someone said before. The human mind is far better at generalizing and can reuse learned skills in different fields.
Humans have been trained for all the different scenarios you cite, AlphaGo has just been trained for go. Give AlphaGo 20 years to chew through training data and I think it would destroy a college sophomore at cognition.
When a computer itself makes a persuasive argument that it is intelligent (without coaching.)
I have always believed AI is possible, and I am undecided whether current techniques alone will get us there, or whether other breakthroughs are needed, but I have no time for premature claims of success.
> the goalpost on what is "true AI" shifts to be something that computers can't do yet
while I agree that this does happen, I don't think it did in this case - that is, I don't remember anyone saying that they would take a computer beating the top human in Go as evidence of "true AI"
> So let me ask you this. What would you consider to be "true AI"? At what point are you willing to say, "Okay, that's it, computers are just plain smarter than we are?" Because, frankly, it seems to me that that day is getting closer and closer.
Alan Turing would give the system the "Turing test". If a computer can fool a human into thinking it's a human, then it is true AI, according to Turing.
I think that's a pretty good test. Some would argue that this is already possible with some advanced natural language processing systems. But these are not extensive tests, from what I've seen. People have to decide if the system is machine or human after just a few minutes of interaction. Turing probably meant for the test to be rigorous and to be performed by the smartest human. Deciding a conversational partner is a human after 5 minutes of interaction is not enough. 10 years might not be enough. I honestly couldn't say when enough is enough, which is part of what makes Turing's definition so complicated, even though it seems simple on the surface.
I would add that currently, systems cannot set their own goals. There is always a human telling them what to be good at. Every machine-learning-based system is application-specific and not general. There are some algorithms that are good at generalization. You might be able to write one algorithm that's good at multiple tasks without modifying it at all. But from what I've seen, we are nowhere near being able to write one program that can be applied universally to any problem, and we are even further from one that can identify its own problems and set its own goals.
As humans, do we even know our own goals? Stay alive, right? Make the best use of our time. How does the quality of "intelligence" translate to computers which are, as far as they know, unconstrained by time and life or death? What force would compel a self-driven computer to act? Should we threaten them with death if they do not continue learning and continue self-improvement? If I hold a bat over my laptop and swing at it, does it run my program faster? If I speak to it sweetly, does it respond by doing more work for me? Further, are animals intelligent or are they not?
It gets pretty philosophical. What are your thoughts?
> Saying that AIs can't be smarter than humans because they don't think and act like humans is like saying that airplanes don't "truly" fly because they don't flap their wings.
That's just semantics. I think any conversation about this must define intelligence really carefully. We all perceive things differently, so it's impossible to be sure we're talking about the same thing. Maybe that's one other quality of intelligence that separates us from computers. Every computer perceives a given input the same exact way. Can we say that about humans? If there were another dimension with the same atomic makeup as our own, would I think the same things as I do in this dimension? Are my thoughts independent or dependent upon my environment? Is anything truly random?
Anyway, for me, independent goal setting is a key element of true AI. And philosophically speaking, I believe we can't guarantee that we set our own goals independently. Most of us have a strong feeling that we act of our own volition and fate does not exist. And I think that's right. But what if there is no randomness and we are entirely products of our environment? Then under this definition, we don't have independent goal setting and we are not true AI.
Brilliant answer - independent goal setting is a really interesting alternative phrasing of "soul" or "spirit" or "individuality", because unlike those, it can be easily observed or tested. Great writeup, thanks for making me think.
I think humanity will be drastically changed by AI-made decisions calculated by human overseers but not so much that AI will be designed to communicate with one another, have access to markets, and the freedom to decide what they want to do. Is there a sci-fi novel that assumes that approach?
We know that true human intelligence includes being able to help machines think better. So it seems reasonable to state that true machine intelligence includes being able to help humans think better.
Other things that humans can do that machines can't yet:
* change other human's minds
* contribute to the state of the art of human knowledge
* determine the difference between a human and a machine.
I'm afraid I don't understand the point you're making with "computer says no".
> Genetic algorithms have designed circuitry that we failed to even understand at first but that did work.
This is an excellent example of what I think of as not machine intelligence. If humans can't understand it then it's something entirely different that we need a different word for - an "artefact", perhaps. Meaningfully contributing to the state of the art of human knowledge requires being built upon. If these genetic algorithms can explain how they can be incorporated into the design process by humans, that's intelligence. If they are similar to being able to evolve a mantis shrimp by fiddling with DNA, that is marvellous but not what I would regard as intelligence.
We apply the same standard to human intelligence: someone who can multiply numbers very fast but not explain how they can do it is a savant; someone who can discover and teach other people a faster way of multiplication is intelligent.
Savant literally means 'one who knows', and they're not required to explain to you how they know, it's up to you to verify that they do. Just like a chess grand master doesn't have to prove to you he or she is intelligent, it's enough that they beat you. They are under no obligation to prove their intelligence to you by teaching you the same (assuming you could follow in the first place).
> Meaningfully contributing to the state of the art of human knowledge requires being built upon.
No, it requires us to understand. But we will not always be able to (in the case of those circuits we eventually figured it out, but not at first). And in Chess we did too, computer chess made some (the best) chess players better at chess. But there is no reason to assume this will always be the case and that's a limit of our intelligence.
I think you're indeed arguing a sensible definition of Artificial Intelligence, but it's not what most people (especially laymen) mean by the phrase. I think most actually equivocate AI with Artificial Sapience: some cognitive architecture that can—in theory, with the right training—do all the things humans do (socialize, write persuasive essays, create art, etc.) at least as well as the average human.
Though in all honesty, I think a lot of people just want to see a machine with emotional "instincts" and an understanding of tribal status-hierarchy dynamics such that you can empathize with it. A lot of people would consider a machine that accurately simulated a rather dumb chimpanzee to be "smart enough" to qualify as AI, even if it couldn't do any useful human intellectual labor.
It could one day be possible. There are savants that have the ability to work with complex working sets e.g. reciting Pi to a ridiculous precision, multiplying very large numbers or recalling images with photographic detail.
So perhaps the problem isn't our brain's hardware as such but the operating system that runs on top of it.
And be careful of systemd. Most days you'll wake up in 2 seconds but occasionally you'll be comatose for the whole day with no way to find out what's wrong.
> There are savants that have the ability to work with complex working sets e.g. reciting Pi to a ridiculous precision, multiplying very large numbers or recalling images with photographic detail.
Yes, but all computers do those things millions of times faster than even savants. And the computers are getting faster at it every year, savants today aren't any more clever than savants 100 years ago.
The problem with 'flag and footprints' demonstrations is precisely the same as their attraction - they are, in essence (even though that was not the intent), selected to be as misleading as possible about progress in solving the real problems.
We put a man on the moon, which encouraged decades of optimism about the near-future colonization of space... unfortunately it turns out we are nowhere near solving the hard problems associated with being able to live in space.
We spelled out the letters IBM in xenon atoms, five atoms tall, which encouraged optimism about near-future molecular manufacturing... unfortunately it turns out we are nowhere near solving the hard problems associated with making useful things with atomic precision.
We achieve superhuman performance in simple games, which encourages what should be optimism that becomes reflected by the distorting mirror of the zeitgeist of the times into pessimism, about near-future AI... unfortunately it turns out we are nowhere near solving the hard problems associated with making our tools something better than depressingly dumb.
In each case, the flurry of optimism turns as the decades pass into confusion, anger, soul-searching about why the expected follow-on progress has failed to materialize, fading slowly into despair, then into nothing as the optimists die of old age, one by one, and the rate of technological progress becomes slower with every passing decade. For this conversation is necessarily happening at a tech level that allows it, but that provides no guarantee whatsoever that the species that reached tech level X will proceed to tech level X+1. Moore's law has officially expired, and that was the last major area where we were making rapid sustained progress.
It's hard to say we shouldn't do 'flag and footprints' demonstrations; am I really willing to bite the bullet and say we shouldn't have put a man on the moon? I don't know the answer to that. I am, however, convinced that we should remember not to take them too seriously.
The "flag and footprints" demonstrations serve essentially as prototypes. They demonstrate that a certain tech level is possible. But as anyone who's built a prototype knows, when the prototype works you are maybe 5% of the way there.
We put a man on the moon in 1969, and we are just now getting privately-funded spaceflight and satellites. We made the first computers in 1945; we got them on every desk in the 1980s. The first steamboat was built in 1783; the transatlantic shipping industry didn't transition to steam until the 1840s & 1850s.
Probably some kid who's watching AlphaGo's game today is the person who, late in life, invents the first strong AI.
Sorry but more research will reveal massive progress in the fields connected to those ideals. Please research some more, you have missed quite a few developments.
For example, long stays in large space stations, landing craft on Mars, successful isolation sustainability experiments, 14nm chips and understanding of quantum concerns, multi-layer chips, beginnings of optical computing, biological/genetic chemical synthesis, neuromorphic chips, etc.
Deep reinforcement learning is undeniably a major step forward for general intelligence.
You and others with your belief system will still be in denial up to and past the point where your species becomes irrelevant as the superintelligent AIs arrive within a few decades.
The implication is that humans have been trapped in a local maxima in terms of strategy and board reading. The question then becomes whether we can use this to bootstrap ourselves.
Now that's a really interesting question. Give AlphaGo progressively worse losing positions and see if it can rescue what the human masters would consider a disaster.
I wonder if he could identify those long-term-thinking moves by playing a version of AlphaGo on a smaller board, then gradually increasing the size of the board over successive games once he is able to consistently win or tie at a given board size.
I also wonder if when Alpha Go plays itself, does it always win when it is black or white, does it always tie, or is it a mix?
I was thinking the opposite. AI has already been beating humans on smaller boards, so maybe the only chance we have is to start playing go on bigger and bigger boards.
Huh, interesting. I'm not well-versed in Go at all.
It would be interesting if AlphaGo's maneuvers remain opaque to humans for an extended period of time. Can anyone at this point say with confidence that its strategies will indefinitely remain unknown?
If this plays out anything like it did in chess, in a few years we'll have very strong machine players that we can use to figure out with high confidence the quality of both players' moves.
Obviously the chances for humans to win, increase with the board size.
Given the computational power (=number of cpu/gpu) is fixed and the time for each move to be done is fixed.
Perhaps a future "dr. evil / skynet" A.I. will first try to conquer the microchip production plants to increase its computational power and memory. goodbye taiwan, goodbye south korea, goodbye usa...
There is typically a point advantage of around 7 points when you get the chance to play the first move. In professional matches, white will be given a 6.5 point bonus to compensate for this. So yes I think it's fair to assume that black usually wins. Actually, AlphaGo could probably be used to calculate the perfect number of points, because it has changed over the years. In China they have a 7.5 point bonus for white.
>> But Go is rich enough to demonstrate strong cognitive uncontainability on a small scale. In a rich and complicated domain whose rules aren't fully known, we should expect even more magic from superhuman reasoning - solutions that are better than the best solution we could imagine, operating by causal pathways we wouldn't be able to foresee even if we were told the AI's exact actions.
Hang on. Where are we going to find this magic agent that can do "even more" in "a
rich and complicated domain whose rules aren't fully known" (the real world, as
opposed to a Go board) than in a game of Go? What are we going to train such a
learner with, if we ourselves don't fully know the rules of the domain, as you
point out?
Even if a learner somehow magically found a superhuman path to perfect reasoning
which is unavailable to us, entirely by accident and purely on its own, why would
we select it from other trained learners to keep and foster further, if we think
it's actually pretty dumb, rather than magically smart?
You're saying at some point that a fantastic paperclip maximiser might
achieve superhuman intelligence and then lie in waiting, poised to turn us all
into paperclips only when it knew it was safe to make its move, basically. But,
how is it going to become that smart in the first place? It has to be smart enough
to know that it must bide its time, but dumb enough that its time hasn't come yet.
Sounds like a bit of an impossible double-bind there.
Just because sufficiently advanced AI may look like magic at first, it doesn't
mean we should start all believing in magic because it may just be sufficiently
advanced AI in disguise.
> What are we going to train such a learner with, if we ourselves don't fully know the rules of the domain, as you point out?
This does not make any sense if you assume general intelligence. A physicist who makes a discovery also was not trained to know about this new law or rule beforehand (how could he?).
On the other hand, in many ways AlphaGo plays much like a human professional. The openings and fights were not radically different. The professional commentators did not have a hard time explaining why most moves were good. The structure of the board was understandable. Some moves were "forced" moves that were predictable and many others were good moves that a human would play. The human player isn't efficient enough to win, but attacks and defenses still mostly work as intended.
This suggests that Go space was already very well understood and there aren't radically different play styles we've somehow overlooked. AI is not a magic wand that radically changes how the game works.
However there may be some bias due to AlphaGo having trained on human games and playing against a human. The real proof will happen when they redo the retraining from scratch.
How do we know that it's not just that the AI dominates the later stages where the number of permutations has reduced to the point where AI can calculate optimal moves? In other words, how do we know that the computer has an edge on the early stages and isn't just breaking even until the later stages with less permutations arrive, at which point it dominates because there are still too many for humans to assess?
> the stark degree to which "AlphaGo output that move because the board will later be in a winning state" sometimes doesn't correlate with conventional Go goals like taking territory or being up on points
Minor quibbles: 1) taking territory or being up on points are the same thing, and 2) in go there are many other things to optimize for besides territory/points - influence, shape, efficiency, and sente being examples of this.
> For all we know from what we've seen, AlphaGo could win even if Sedol were allowed a one-stone handicap.
What do you mean by a one-stone handicap? Just no komi?
> In the case of AlphaGo, an extremely optimized strategy seems to have thrown away the 'typical' production of a visible point lead that characterizes human play. Maximizing win-probability in Go, at this level of play against a human 9p, is not strongly correlated with what a human can see as visible extra territory - so that gets thrown out even though it was previously associated with 'trying to win' in human play.
Pros have been aware for centuries that "visible extra territory" is a poor indicator of win probability. They use the term "thickness" (in English) to denote the positive potential resulting from a strong, safe, influential position, independent of current territory. Quite often a pro game will be a battle of territory vs thickness.
I agree with you as this makes perfect sense. I'm new to the game Go but have been riveted by these games and the commentary.
Here's where I think you're right. It seems from the commentary during the matches that the pro player thought the game to be close...on every match.
Then the tides turned...or so we thought...and the game always swayed in AlphaGo's favor.
I like how they were saying that the computer changed up the game style as well.
All of this is very interesting, and I see that they have games 4 and 5 listed however I wonder if they are going to go thru with them and play them as scheduled.
Maybe to see if AlphaGo can sweep the series? Or show it wasn't a fluke of any kind?
I hope they play the last two...just to see how AlphaGo plays them. :D
They will play all 5 games in the match. The result can end up 3-2 4-1 or 5-0. Based on the past 3 which ended as sound defeats for Lee with different play styles and approaches (aggressive, calm and a mix typical of his usual game) I expect the final result will be 5-0 for AlphaGo.
>> At this point it seems likely that Sedol is actually far outclassed by a
superhuman player.
I still don't agree that this is the case, and I don't care what a thousand
Google-hyped press releases say, beating the best human player in anything is
not "superhuman" and "superhuman" performance has not been achieved by anything
yet. [1]
Why do I think so? Two reasons.
One, because you can be entirely human and still beat all other humans, without
fail for a very long time. Long "winning streaks" in professional sports are
very well documented. For instance Rocky Marciano went entirely undefeated in
his whole heavyweight boxing career. In chess, Mikhail Tal went undefeated for
95 games. And so on, so forth.
Of course most humans' winning streaks end eventually. That's because our
performance degrades over time. When a computer wins against the best player, it
keeps on winning, and in fact it actually gets even better over time.
Still, and this is number two: in most instances where a computer does better
than a human, we don't claim superhuman performance. Automatic calculators,
going back to mechanical calculators, have been better than humans at arithmetic
for a very, very long time. I would wager that nobody discusses pocket
calculators as exhibiting "superhuman" performance. You only hear this sort of
claim when it comes to Deep Blue, AlphaGo or Watson.
So maybe we need a better definition of what it means to be "superhuman" that
covers both pocket calculators and AlphaGo. Without one, I don't accept that
the performance of AlphaGo can be said to be superhuman, unless pocket
calculators' performance is also celebrated as superhuman.
_______________________
[1] I'm perfectly willing to go even further than that and say that we can't make machines that have
superhuman intelligence and that even if we did, we wouldn't be able to
recognise them (this last bit is similar to what the GP says).
Superhuman has a very specific definition in the field of game playing algorithms. It is the case when the algorithm can always beat all humans. AlphaGo winning 5-0 against the number 5 ranked human (Lee) would give only a small indication that it is superhuman. Regarding streaks, evenly matched humans can go 5-0 an expected (0.5)^5 or 3.125 percent of the time. So not particularly rare. If it loses even one game then it is not yet superhuman.
If top humans get beat 5-0 with significant handicaps then it is likely AlphaGo is superhuman. However, it is expensive to run AlphaGo so it is unlikely that we will know the true strength of AlphaGo for a while (more challenges) or until hardware catches up.
The term ("superhuman") is used very differently in other communities though, that don't have such a clear metric of "beating humans" as in traditional game-playing. Which means it's about time we clarify what is meant by it, especially as various parties that have commercial interests start throwing it around carelessly (there was an example on HN a while ago).
The way in which it is superhuman matters. The calculator uses simple mechanical algorithms. Alpha Go uses a completely novel approach to deep learning that can likely be applied to many other systems/problems.
As long as those systems/problems include a grid based problem space where the goal is to successfully place stones restricted by a limited set of rules.
Ok flippancy aside, there are two problems that make techniques like this single-domain: network design and network training.
The design, uses multiple networks for different goals: board eval (what boards look good) and policy (which moves to focus on). Those two goals, eval and policy, are very specific to go. Just like category layers are specific to vision and LSTM is specific to sequence learning.
Network training is obviously hugely resource intensive -- and each significantly complex problem would need such intensity.
It is amazing the variety of problems DNNs have been able to do well in. However, the problem of network design and efficient training are significant barriers to generalization.
When network design can be addressed algorithmically I think we may have an AGI. However, that is a significant problem where you automatically add another layer of computational complexity so it is not on the immediate horizon and may be 50+ years down the road.
My pocket calculator is faster than a human and has better memory. I don't know that this means the same thing as "superhuman in arithmetic". I can concede that it means superhuman in speed and memory, but, arithmetic? I don't think so. What it really does is move bits around registers. We are the ones interpreting those as numbers and the results of arithmetic operations.
AlphaGo is rather different in that it actually has a representation of the game of Go and it knows how to play. I don't doubt at all that it's intelligent, in the restricted domain it operates in. But I do doubt that it's possible for an intelligence built by humans to be "superhuman" and I don't see how your one-liner addresses that.
Your calculator does have a representation of arithmetic too. It's those bits is moves around in registers, which are very much isomorphic to the relevant arithmetic.
Why would an intelligence built by humans not be able to be superhuman? The generally accepted definition seems to be "having better than human performance" in which case it seems we've done it many times (like with calculators).
>> The generally accepted definition seems to be "having better than human performance"
I don't think there's a generally accepted definition and I don't agree that
performance on its own is a good measure. Humans are certainly not as good at
mechanical tasks as machines are -duh. But how can you call "superhuman"
something that doesn't even know what it's doing, even as it's doing it faster
and more accurately than us?
Take arithmetic again. We know that cat's can't do arithmetic, because they
don't understand numbers, so it's safe to say humans have super-feline
arithmetic ability. But then, how is a pocket calculator super-human, if it
doesn't know what numbers are for, any more than a cat does? There's something missing from the
definition and therefore the measurement of the task.
I don't claim to have this missing something, mind you.
>> Why would an intelligence built by humans not be able to be superhuman?
Ah. Apologies, I got carried away a bit there. I meant to discuss how I doubt we
can create superhuman intelligence using machine learing specifically. My thinking goes like
this: we train machine learning algorithms using examples; to train an algorithm
to exhibit superhuman intelligence we'd need examples of superhuman
intelligence; we can't produce such examples because our intelligence is merely
human; therefore we can't train a superhuman intelligence.
I also doubt that we can create a superhuman intelligence in any other way, at
least intentionally, or that we would be able to recognise one if we created it
by chance, but I'm not prepared to argue this. Again, sorry about that.
>> Your calculator does have a representation of arithmetic too. It's those bits is
moves around in registers, which are very much isomorphic to the relevant
arithmetic.
Hm. Strictly speaking I believe my pocket calculator has an FPGA, a
general-purpose architecture that in my calculator happens to be programmed for
arithmetic, specifically. So I think it's accurate for me to say that, although
the calculator has a program and that program certainly is a representation of
arithmetic, I have to provide the interpretation of the program and reify the
representation as arithmetic.
In other words, the program is a representation of arithmetic to me, not to the calculator. The calculator might as well be programmed to randomly beep, and it wouldn't have any way to know the difference.
(But that'd be a cruel thing to do to the poor calculator).
There used to be jobs for thousands of people to do what pocket calculators do. Those jobs have been gone for decades. Humans entirely replaced by machines. So, yes, calculators are superhuman.
I agree somewhat, but then what is your gauge for superhuman if not some type of competition? How do you evaluate it?
On another note, Rocky Marciano had the mafia behind him. Harry Haft fought him and was knocked out, and later claimed the mafia told him he had to throw the fight [1].
There's also a good graphic novel about this. Maybe the AI's goons have threatened Sedol or kin ;)
>> what is your gauge for superhuman if not some type of competition?
To be honest- I don't have one. My intuition is that we can't have a good definition of "superhuman intelligence" because having one would require us to demonstrate superhuman intelligence ourselves. Which is obviously a contradiction.
Intuitively, a calculator is not superhuman.
A person who could do mental arithmetic as well as a calculator? That would seem to be superhuman.
If you find out that they were using a calculator under the table the whole time, they're not superhuman any more.
So I think the word "superhuman" must imply a fair competition, in the sense that the participants are competing using comparable approaches. For some definition of comparable.
I think this is one of the most fascinating (and disturbing) facts about AI: they seek to solve the problem they are given without being dependent on convention. They are completely alien in this regard, so many of their choices don't make any sense to us. This results in huge possibility but also the huge dangers that people worry about.
Regarding the expectation that it would have gone 5-0 or 4-1 to either one, you'd have to have equally predicted a similarly one-sided result in the Deep Blue v Kasparov match. Rate of improvement might end up being completely domain-dependent, and hard to predict a-priori how it will turn out.
Or its just playing along until the state is complex enough, when it outperforms Seoul simply in terms of memory. I'd call that mid-term, my offer as a compromise ;)
>> AlphaGo's core is built around a similar machine learning technology to Deepmind's Atari-playing system - the single, untweaked program that was able to learn superhuman play on dozens of different Atari games just by looking at the pixels, without specialization for each particular game.
Woa there. The Deepmind Atari-playing AI was too specialised for each particular
game. It had a reward function that translated the score for it. It couldn't
learn the importance of the game score on its own, just from "looking at the
pixels" and it couldn't learn the significance of the score display and how it
changed as a result of its actions on its own. All this had to be hand-coded.
And if I've seen a hint that this means it couldn't really-really generalise to
other games, like Deepmind claimed, then that's this bit that you report
yourself:
>> Deepmind ... did reuse the widely
known core insight of Monte Carlo Tree Search.
That is no mere detail. That is the crux of the matter, right there. Deepmind
used their architecture to improve MCTS far enough that it could beat Lee
Se-Dol. They didn't just add MCTS to their already general-game playing system.
Because the original Atari-playing AI was completely useless for playing Go, a
game that doesn't have a score and looks nothing like an Atari game. So it
wasn't very general at all, despite Google's and DeepMind's claims to the
contrary.
I think you're wrong here. From the Nature paper describing AlphaGo:
"We also tested against the strongest open-source Go program, Pachi, a sophisticated Monte Carlo search program, ranked at 2 amateur dan on KGS, that executes 100,000 simulations per move. Using no search at all, the RL policy network won 85% of games against Pachi."
AlphaGo does use MCTS, but it seems that most of its improvements are actually coming from the deep reinforcement learning approach.
I don't know whether this is true. If AlphaGo could do just as well without search, then why did it use search at all?
But in any case, I'm not necessarily disputing that. I'm particularly refuting the claim that the AlphaGo architecture is identical to the one that learned to play Atari games and that Deepmind have advertised as a general game-playing agent.
My comment here is specifically in reply to the GP who repeated this claim, but I'll dig up the relevant link if you're interested.
Oh, fair enough. There are certainly differences; it's definitely not exact same architecture. They are both using Deep Reinforcement Learning, but e.g. AlphaGo benefits from getting an explicit representation of the board state and game rules rather than having to learn them.
Hassabis has said that in the next few months they want to try and get up to current AlphaGo performance without using any MCTS at all.
The idea is that even there's a policy network that is able to decide at some point what the best possible move is, the tree search is done to refine this choice and to "evaluate" it. This is why a value network is derived from policy network and is used in conjunction with MCTS to make sure that the moves AlphaGo picks are good ones.
It is necessary to make multiple alternatives in the tree comparable in an easy way (and nothing is better comparable than scalars). They could also go about training a network that compares two positions to decide which one is superior, but that would require much more computation. Or another alternative would possibly to learn the value somehow jointly with the action selection, but that would possibly also be harder both to train and evaluate.
Noone really said that AlphaGo is identical to the Atari playing AI from a while ago. What Deepmind did say is that that agent was a general game-playing agent. If it was, then why was it not employed against Lee Sedol? Well- because it wasn't.
https://www.facebook.com/yudkowsky/posts/10154018209759228
Sample:
At this point it seems likely that Sedol is actually far outclassed by a superhuman player. The suspicion is that since AlphaGo plays purely for probability of long-term victory rather than playing for points, the fight against Sedol generates boards that can falsely appear to a human to be balanced even as Sedol's probability of victory diminishes. The 8p and 9p pros who analyzed games 1 and 2 and thought the flow of a seemingly Sedol-favoring game 'eventually' shifted to AlphaGo later, may simply have failed to read the board's true state. The reality may be a slow, steady diminishment of Sedol's win probability as the game goes on and Sedol makes subtly imperfect moves that humans think result in even-looking boards...
The case of AlphaGo is a helpful concrete illustration of these concepts [from AI alignment theory]...
Edge instantiation. Extremely optimized strategies often look to us like 'weird' edges of the possibility space, and may throw away what we think of as 'typical' features of a solution. In many different kinds of optimization problem, the maximizing solution will lie at a vertex of the possibility space (a corner, an edge-case). In the case of AlphaGo, an extremely optimized strategy seems to have thrown away the 'typical' production of a visible point lead that characterizes human play...