a) No one time pad is used, because that would make the whole point of publishing the encrypted blob pointless in the first place. The point of publishing it is that the key could be published very easily in an emergency, e.g. using a tweet. If the one time pad key has to be published, he could just keep the data to himself and publish it unencrypted later. Pretty pointless.
b) The argument about deferred encryption may be correct. However this is not related to the relations between Wikileaks and any government. (The argument may also be wrong. It could turn out that decrypting AES is still hard even in 100 years. In any case it is likely to be safe until the data is de-classified anyway.)
b) The argument about deferred encryption may be correct. However this is not related to the relations between Wikileaks and any government. (The argument may also be wrong. It could turn out that decrypting AES is still hard even in 100 years. In any case it is likely to be safe until the data is de-classified anyway.)