You might just as well say it is the IANA's fault for issuing the IP addresses the malware authors used, or Ford's fault for building the getaway car used in a bank robbery.
Turning over IANA or Ford over to Microsoft would not prevent malware or robberies. Turning over NoIP to Microsoft will prevent malware (at least in the short term).
And what about any innocent users of Dynamic DNS who are currently suffering from the consequences of this action? No-IP's statement implies that this is somewhat widespread and due to Microsoft's inability to handle the responsibility it has somehow acquired in this case. Others on HN seem to be posting independent verification of this using standard tools from their own systems.
In short, it is neither obvious that turning over NoIP's domains to Microsoft will prevent malware, nor clear what should happen if it doesn't, and it is certainly not clear that Microsoft will not cause more damage than they repair by acting in this way or what should happen if they do.
You're kidding right? I honestly burst out with a laugh when I read this. In what world do you live in where Microsoft seizing control of a single dynamic DNS provider will "prevent malware" (even in the short term)?
It's not like this motion has created some insurmountable wall that malware creators can't possibly work around.
It of course did not create insurmountable wall, but many malware platforms rely on free DNS services for establishing communications, and if particular strain is hardcoded to use no-ip, the instances that rely on it would not be able to establish the connections and thus would not be controlled by botnet owner anymore, at least for the time it takes to either deliver update by other means (provided such means are coded in particular strain) or re-infect the machine with different strain of malware. Of course, once malware authors know no-ip is no longer their friend, they'd move on to use different services, but the instances that were produced before that may very well be disrupted.
In any event, the malware will at least not resolve to a no-ip.com address, since apparently nothing is able to consistently resolve to such addresses anymore...
Well, how exactly does this prevent malware? Oh, that's right: by shutting down thousands of malware-serving DNS records. (And, btw, millions of legitimate records - but hey, that's just collateral damage; a thousand, a million, same thing, right?)
Using the same logic, let's just prevent malware altogether by blackholing all of the Internet traffic - problem solved!
