Public key cryptography in my eyes is the only proper way to do electronic voting, but it has a severe cost - the lack of secrecy. As anyone knows, the lack of secrecy comes with even more severe ramifications, the purchase of votes, pressure from friends/family/employers, the potential to be arrested in a fascist government, the list goes on.

There might be some validity to that, but I think you are blurring the lines between a private key being issued to someone and others knowing their vote, which would only happen if other know their public voting key.

Public key cryptography by nature requires a persons identity SOMEHOW be tied to their private key. Even if I get a private key issued by the government without any identifying information embedded in it, it's still tied to my identity, at the very least whoever administers the vote knows who I voted for - at least with a paper ballot no one but me knows what ballot I submitted.

True, although I think a centralized organization for identity, while not at all ideal, is different than everyone knowing who you voted for.

I wonder if there are methods for mixing identities. Bitcoin mixing services have many people put coins into a pool, then outputs balances to new addresses. It isn't a 1:1 comparison at all, but I wonder if there are methods that could be used.

If more than one identity service is used I wonder if the multiple keys could be mixed to create a unique key that only the voter knows.